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Abstract 
This paper examines the magnitude and direction of creative accounting following contemporaneous mergers and 
acquisitions consummated under duress, and abnormal corporate board changes taking evidence from Nigeria. But 
most importantly, the paper determines whether any likely resultant abnormal accrual following corporate 
acquisitions can be unconsciously normalized by ‘big bath’ accounting players following contemporaneous non-
routine board leader replacement. Evidence has shown that following acquisitions, mangers can engage in income-
increasing management on one hand. On the other hand, new CEOs can give earnings a ‘big’ downward ‘bath’ 
blaming their predecessors for the poor performance while pursuing personal contractual performance benefit. 
Hence, within extensive researches already carried out on the impacts of acquisitions and board replacement on 
creative accounting, there remains unanswered question of the extent of accrual manipulation when the two events 
occur simultaneously. Drawing heavily from Jones and Dechow models in estimating normal accrual, normal cash 
flow from operations and both discretionary accrual and cash flow, we report consistent with extant literatures, 
that under consolidation duress, the victim firms engage in a significant discretionary income-increasing 
manipulation. Our study also confirms that significant downward accrual management follows corporate board 
changes in Nigeria. However, the board changes that follow consolidation restructuring limit the persistence of the 
abnormal accrual in the end. We find that the ‘Big bath’ accounting players reverse although unconsciously a 
significant proportion of the upward managed accrual from opportunistic perspective. The ratio of pre 
consolidation accrual hiking to post-consolidation board changes reversal is 3:2, which indicates 67% 
normalization for stock based acquisitions. For cash based acquisitions however, the reversal is much lower. Our 
findings suggest that where abnormal earnings is highly suspected following involuntary acquisitions, board 
restructuring that will lead to new managers could help in correcting or reversing significant proportion of the 
accrual abnormality.  
Keywords: Discretionary Accounting, Consolidations, Earnings management, Mergers and acquisitions, Accrual  
 
Introduction  
The past few years have witnessed significant bank mergers and acquisitions with evidence of rising 
contemporaneous board changes that are regulatory in nature. While bank mergers and acquisitions are targeted 
towards solidifying the weighted asset bases to help absorb any likely insolvency threat, there has been a rising 
concern that the phenomena encourage earnings management or creative accounting. Similarly, because mergers 
and acquisitions at times precede corporate restructuring, the phenomena have also evoked significant board 
turnover, which as well has the potential of encouraging incoming executive officers with private interest to 
manipulate earnings while blaming their predecessors-a phenomenon called ‘big bath’ accounting as suggested 
originally in Moore (1983). The purpose of this study is, therefore, to examine the magnitude and direction of 
accrual management from the context of contemporaneous involuntary acquisition decisions, and non-routine 
board changes, and then be able to determine whether the interaction of the likely inverse relationship could 
actually net off to the extent of normalizing the abnormal accrual in the post-acquisitions and board turnover 
periods.  
Earnings management has been defined by Healy and Wahley (1999) as that which occurs “when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports either to 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting number”. From the perspective of acquisitions, there has been real 
documentary evidence that significant earnings management follows mergers and acquisitions as extensively 
discussed in Erickson and Wang (1999), and board changes as previously pointed out in Moore (1973) and 
investigated in Mark and Liang, (2010). Comparatively, the discretionary accrual relationship between the two 
scenarios is in an opposite direction. That is, while potential out going managers have the tendency to manage 
accrual upward following acquisitions; potential incoming managers manage accrual downward following board 
changes. For acquisition consummated voluntarily, an incentive to report higher earnings during acquisitions 
boarders on the managers’ desire to obtain stock exchange benefits and sustain higher stock prices due to the 
association between executive pay and performance goal realization according to extant literatures. Following the 
study of Erickson and Wang (1999), and Louis (2004), several firms have managed accrual to obtain stock benefits 
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around corporate acquisitions. For instance, they found that among several US firms, earnings management heavily 
occurs prior to their mergers and acquisitions particularly when the acquisitions involve share-for-share exchange 
deals. In another instance, among the Japanese firms, managers manipulated earnings prior to consummating 
mergers and acquisitions to obtain share for share advantage.  
Although this evidence of upward accrual manipulation following acquisitions can provide useful 
information to investors, we suspect that there could be little likelihood that this abnormal accrual will persist in 
the future where acquisitions bring in new board leaders. This is because there is documentary strong evidence 
that during board changes, incoming CEOs stripe earnings of normal accrual to obtain a private gain in the future 
in several studies such as Moore (1973); Wells (2002), and Mark and Liang, (2010). It is arguable that this trade-
off relationship can significantly reverse abnormal accrual and normalize spurious earnings following mergers and 
acquisitions. If this anticipated relationship is significant in normalizing abnormal earnings, then it has significant 
implications for policy makers, who view mergers and acquisitions as gate ways for misleading investors even in 
the short run. This suggests that there will be a need to rethink our earnings management model as a guide for our 
decisions particularly in Nigeria where significant mergers and acquisitions with contemporaneous board changes 
have taken place within the past decade. Unfortunately, these phenomena more or less have been involuntary and 
there has remained little or no evidence on how managers, incoming and outgoing board leaders 
contemporaneously manage earnings around the involuntary events in Nigeria.  
Mergers and acquisitions are really complex phenomena usually targeted towards aligning the 
consummating firms with risk weighted assets to save particularly investors and creditors from the risks associated 
with corporate failures. This means, for the regulators, the main purpose of forcing firms to merge is to solidify 
them against destroying investors’ stakes. Purgaliya and Vijh (2009) discovered that the phenomena are important 
events associated with the creation, destruction and redistribution of shareholders’ wealth. This accounts for 
perhaps why in most cases the measures to achieve such alignment could be urgent and mandatory leading to the 
victim firms merging involuntarily to meet the demand. Take for instance; firms in Nigeria have involuntarily 
merged to the extent that 89 firms out of pressure from regulatory authority merged into few mega firms. These 
were involuntary mergers and acquisitions, which were not strategic. Involuntary mergers and acquisitions are 
usually consummated under duress to avoid a liquidation penalty. The regulation in Nigeria has always been merge, 
recapitalize or be liquidated. Banks have always preferred to merge rather than being liquidated. However, the 
queer issue emerging in these kinds of involuntary events is that in the course of the consummations, managers 
could engage in earnings management for various reasons. First, they can cook their books not only to influence 
the outcome to the benefit of some stakeholders, but also to enhance capital in order to meet the upward capital 
review demand. Second, they can engage in discretionary accrual to achieve future selfish compensation advantage. 
Finally, they can embark on early manipulation to leverage their capital to meet the floor capital requirement and 
escape default risk like liquidation threat particularly if they are not willing to merge with any bank.  
While the incumbent managers may have manipulated the accounting information to avoid liquidation 
threat, the incoming managers may have another strategy targeted toward servicing their selfish aims. If this desire 
downplays on earnings, it could normalize the previously abnormal earnings following the acquisitions. Previous 
reports on the likelihood of reversing abnormal accrual concentrated on the role of performance news in the 
following year as investigated in the studies of Pyung et al (2015) and Sloan (1996). Pyung et al (2015) document 
that earnings related news is very influential in correcting accrual. However, they revealed that earnings could be 
corrected without earnings performance news. Our study therefore investigates the likelihood of accrual correction 
through interaction of upward accrual by former CEOs and new CEOs motivated by the desire for performance 
contractual benefit. These opportunistic individuals engage in a ‘big bath’ accounting while blaming their 
predecessors for the charade poor performance. Because of the reversible nature of accrual, they can make higher 
provision for depreciation that can counter the previous under provision by the former mangers to obtain share for 
share benefits. Therefore, our study is in two dimensions and contributes to literature as such. First, we investigate 
the direction and the extent of discretionary accrual following involuntary acquisitions period of firms and second, 
we determine whether the direction could be reversed by incoming CEOs where restructuring brings them in board 
leadership. Although this work draws largely from other related studies such as Erickson and Wang (1999) and 
Louis (2004) in terms of discretionary accrual around mergers and acquisitions, and the work of Pyung et al (2015) 
and Sloan (1996) in terms of accrual corrections, it makes a difference and significantly contributes to literatures 
by being among the first to examine the direction and magnitude of discretionary accrual following involuntary 
acquisitions and board turnover.  
In the remainder of the paper, we shall be dealing with sections, which involve literature review and 
hypotheses development, research methodology, univariate and multivariate tests, and discussion of the results. 
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Literature Review Based on Specific Objectives and Hypotheses Development. 
Earnings management around Mergers and Acquisitions Stock-for-Stock and Cash Deals 
The main objective of this review is to examine what the previous researchers have found as it affects earnings 
management around mergers and acquisitions. The summary of this review will lead us into postulation of our 
specific hypotheses.  
Investors have found that earnings management can trail mergers and acquisitions particularly when the 
acquisitions are voluntary. For instance, Erickson and Wang (1999) found that among US firms, managers increase 
earnings by means of managing accrual to obtain advantage of stock-for-stock benefits. If the acquirers manage 
earnings upward, the shareholders fund will increase. This retained earnings, which forms a part of equity can be 
converted to shares prior to mergers and acquisitions. This will increase the number of stock exchangeable with 
the acquired. This means when acquisition involves stock for stock exchange deals, earnings management takes 
an upward direction. Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004) confirmed this position. However, they found 
that when mergers and acquisitions involve cash deals, the direction is neither positive nor negative, but zero. This 
suggests that there could be no earnings management following mergers and acquisitions when the cost of 
acquisitions involves cash. A couple of studies in this regard such as Heron and Lie (2002) and Purgaliya and Vijh 
(2009), show that the possibility of earnings management following stock-for-stock exchange mergers is due 
largely to estimation error. From their studies when the accrual estimation is properly done, there could be no 
earnings management around consolidation. The above finding involves strategic acquisitions where managers 
have in mind the maximization of shareholders’ value. In an involuntary mergers and acquisitions, firms are 
expected to merge not just to maximize shareholders value but also and mainly to escape liquidation option. Hence, 
we expect to find significant earnings management around this kind of consolidation. First, they can engage in 
earnings management to take advantage of share for share exchange. Second, they can manage earnings to increase 
shareholders’ fund to leverage capital to meet the capital demand, which will be finalized through consummation. 
In this case, we expect that even when the acquisition involves outright cash payment, they can engage in a 
significant discretionary accounting if not for managers to maximize their personal interests, then to increase 
reserves to meet the minimum floor capital demand. Based on the above expositions, we postulate the following 
hypotheses stated in the null. 
H1: Significant upward discretionary accounting does not occur when mergers and acquisitions are involuntary 
and are based on stock-for-stock exchange. 
H2: When acquisitions are involuntary and cash based, significant upward discretionary accounting does not occur. 
 
Earnings Management around Board Turnover  
Starting from Enron, WorldCom failures, and Nigerian banks’ financial crises that led to the loss of millions of 
dollars and Naira, emphasis has been led to corporate governance. One such governance mechanism was to shorten 
the tenure of CEOs. This shortage has however led to more CEOs’ turnover, which has led to another complication 
of earnings management.  Originally, from the context of corporate board changes, Moore (1973) has identified 
although anecdotal in nature a game among new CEOs where they discretionarily give earnings a downward ‘big 
bath’ through accrual manipulations (Graham et al 2005) and/or real activity manipulations (Roychowdhury 2006) 
to purchase charade future growth for enhancement of their compensation packages. This they often do blaming 
their predecessors because CEOs know that few months following their incumbency, expectations from 
shareholders would be low. However, subsequently the expectation will rise in the future. Therefore, in the future 
when the expectation would rise, they would reverse the accrual or real activity manipulated thereby falsely 
enhancing the firms’ value and their rewards. Many investors have been hoodwinked of their hard earned-income 
because of the CEOs use of their managerial latitudes to play the game at their favor (Ramzi 2009). Based on this 
realization, there has been a growing concern in relation to how the new board leaders manage earnings. The 
prevailing opinion is that if the change is non-routine for instance because of sacking, mergers and acquisitions or 
death of incumbent CEOs, the incoming CEOs would likely manage earnings downward blaming such poor 
performance on their predecessors (Well 2002). Mark and Liang (2009) found that if the change is 
contemporaneous with chairpersons, downward management of earnings could occur. Paul et al (2013) found that 
significant real earnings management follows both routine and non-routine CEOs’ changes if the manipulation is 
based on real activities rather than accrual. Evidence also shows that new CEOs manage earnings downward if the 
change is forced, but engage in upward big bath if they are recruited from outside. The interesting thing to note in 
these literatures is that there is the presence of earnings management following board changes. Having established 
such, we argue that this behavior of new CEOs could correct the previously upward managed earnings during 
acquisitions to obtain stock-for-stock advantage. Our major interest boarders on whether the incoming CEOs will 
engage in discretionary accounting that will reverse the earnings managed upward by the outgoing CEOs during 
mergers and acquisitions to benefit from stock for stock exchange or to leverage earnings to enhance their firms’ 
capital standing. Previous literatures on accrual mispricing correction have been focused on performance news. 
Pyung et al (2015) found that clustering returns on news announcement is consistent with the financial press 
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revealing information valuable for the correction of accrual mispricing. They discovered that earnings-related news 
is more influential in the correction process than non-earnings news. Sloan (1996) investigated the role of news in 
accrual correction. He provides evidence according to that because investors fixate on bottom-line earnings, they 
overvalue firms with high accrual and undervalue firms with low accrual. Through his study, he according to 
Pyung et al (2015) found that a significant portion of the resulting mispricing is corrected during the following 
year. He established that nearly 40% of the correction in the first subsequent year is concentrated around earnings 
announcement. The question now arising that depicts research gap is what motivates the news and who makes the 
news? Accrual correction could not just be mechanical that. In our argument, we connect desire for contractual 
benefit as a driving force for managers managing earnings downward and correcting accrual mispricing. Therefore, 
since there is clear evidence of ‘big bath’ accounting by incoming board leaders, based on our review, we postulate 
the third null hypothesis as follows.  
H3: Outgoing managers will always manage earnings upward following mergers and acquisitions restructuring, 
but if the acquisitions involve board changes, the new managers engages in big bath accounting that will counter 
the previously managed earnings by the outgoing CEOs. 
  
Empirical Test  
Research Design and Sample Selection 
We made use of ex-post facto research design since the event under investigation has taken place. The advantage 
of this design is that it does not permit the manipulation of domain variables. Hence, it eschews researcher’s bias. 
Following Dechow et al (1995), who found that rather than using firm time series data in estimating the model, 
industry data could be used. Hence, we used industry data of all the banks that were involved in involuntary 
mergers and acquisitions. We took our sample of involuntary consolidations from BGL Equity Report Database 
and Nigerian Capital Market Bulletins of various volumes. Although financial firms have gross revenue different 
from the normal trading firms, we select all the 24 banks that consolidated under duress, we adjust the earnings 
management detection model in the real analysis as the application of Jones (1991) model and real activity 
manipulation detection model of Dechow et al (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006), which we adopted in our analysis 
are based mainly on trading firms rather than financial service firms. One thing is clear about studies involving 
consolidations. It always suffers from poor sample representation but the poor representation does not always 
impair the result. This is expected to be high when it involves involuntary consolidations as few firms have been 
pressured to merge by regulations. Expectedly, we sampled through purposive sampling technique only 24 banks 
about which there is clear evidence of involuntary consolidations based on our observation of annual financial 
report of several firms between the periods 1996 and 2014. The industry’s data chosen between 1995 and 2005 
constituted the estimation period data for normal accrual following Jones (1991) requirement. Following Dechow 
et al (1995), we switched off the estimation periods by assigning the value 0 to them while we assigned value 1 to 
the event years in this case period from 2006 to 2014, which are periods for most firms that consummated under 
duress with contemporaneous board changes. Since our concern in this paper is to determine the discretionary 
accrual from involuntary acquisition perspective and to determine if the contemporaneous board changes can 
correct the accrual anomaly, we featured board turnover. Firms that consolidated involuntarily and as well carried 
out post consolidation board changes were assigned the value 1. Otherwise, we switched them off by assigning 
zero to them.  
 
Earnings Management Detection Models, Model Specifications and Variable Definitions 
There are several models scholars have formulated in an attempt to detect earnings management. The most famous 
ones are Healey (1985), DeAngelo (1986) Jones (1991), Dechow et al (1995) and models. Based on the previous 
extant literatures and theoretical reviews, we adopted both Jones (1991) and Dechow et al (1995 &1998) models. 
Therefore, our analysis will be based on the Jones (1991) models and Dechow et al (1998) models. We adopted 
Jones model because according to Dechow et al (1995), when compared with Healey and DeAngelo models, Jones 
model has much more potency of detecting discretionary accrual. Researchers apply Dechow et al (1998) in 
detecting discretionary cash flow due to earnings manipulation through real activities. Roychowdhury (2006) 
confirms the efficiency of this model in detecting earnings manipulation through real activity manipulations. 
Jones model is based on a linear regression where researchers can regress change in sales (∆REV) and 
property, plant and equipment (PPE) on total accrual. Total Accrual is determined from the balance sheet or 
statement of income. The model predicts normal accrual by regressing up to 10 years firm’s specific data or 
industries’ data during an estimation period relating to changes in sales to control for current accrual (working-
capital accrual) and changes in PPE to control for accrual due to depreciation and amortization. The estimated 
normal accrual is then compared to the total accrual from the balance sheet to determine the level of discretionary 
accrual involved. The model deflates all the variables including the constant with total assets lagged one year. The 
difference between the total accrual and the predicted normal accrual is the discretionary accrual. The traditional 
Jones model is given thus: 
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 △TACCt=β0+β1△REV+β2PPE+έ                                                                                 (1) 
△TACCt =change in total accrual at the year t deflated by total gross assets at the year t-1. △REV equals change 
in sales at year t, which captures current accrual from sales. PPE controls for provision for depreciation and 
amortization. However, Dechow et al (1995) has adjusted the model to remove the bias that will arise due to 
changes in receivables that are not due to discretionary accounting. The adjusted model, which Jones accepted is:  
△TACCt=β0+β1(△REV-△REC)+β2PPE+έ                                                                 (2)  
All the variables are deflated by lagged total asset at t-1. ∆TACC is change in total accrual determined from 
balance sheet thus: TACC= △CAt - △CLt - △CASH +△STD -DEPt 
TACC; Total Accrual; △CA= Change in Current Assets; △CL= Change in Current Liabilities; △CASH= 
Change in Cash and Cash Equivalent; △STD= Change in Debt included in Current Liabilities; DEP= Depreciation 
and Amortization Expense and  is the change in receivables. έ is the residual. βs are the coefficients of the 
variables. Therefore, from the above the normal discretionary accruals will be determined using the prediction 
model: 
△TACCt = 0 +α1△REV+ α1 PPE                                                                              (3) 






. The discretionary accrual is then determined by subtracting the non-
discretionary accruals from the total accruals.  Following several scholars such as Dechow et al (1995), and Kothari 
et al (2005), we shall carry out a two stage regression analysis. First regression is to determine the discretionary 
accrual as we have already demonstrated above. The second is to regress the variable of interest (Ω) on the 
discretionary accrual (D). The model, following Dechow et al (1995), takes the form thus:  
Dit=α+β1Ωit+ β2δέ                                                                                                          (4) 
We test for discretionary accounting following involuntary mergers and acquisitions by estimating the coefficient 
of Ωit,, which is β. Ωit is the partitioning variable in this context involuntary mergers and acquisitions, and board 
turnover. δ represent the control variables which also influence discretionary accrual. Since our study pools data 
over 18 years between observations and estimations, we set Ωit to be equal to 1 if the observation is from the event 
period. However, if the observation is from the estimation period, we set the partitioning variable to zero following 
Dechow et al (1995). The coefficient on Ωit provides the estimate of the earnings management in response to the 
variable Ωit. If the coefficients are positive, the influence is then to increase discretionary accrual. If, however, the 
sign is negative, the influence of the variable on the discretionary accrual is to decrease it. The probability 
associated with βs will determine whether the influence is statistically significant or not. If significant, the p-value 
is expected to be less or equal to 5%. In this case, we shall reject the null that there is no discretionary accounting 
following involuntary acquisitions in response to the partitioning variable Ωit. Therefore, our model-equation 4-is 
specified thus: 
Discit=α+β1itmer+β2itivaqt+β3itBTRit*mer++β4itINVSK+β5itSZit+β6itROAEit+β7itCFOit+β8itAQit+β9itDBTit+β10itOS
TRit+β11itBDszit+β12itPNEDit++β13itLoss+έ                                                  (5) 
Where, α is a dependent variable’s (Discit) intercept, which captures other controlled variables not included in the 
model. β1it through  β13it  are the explanatory variables’ coefficients. Discit is the discretionary accrual at year t for 
firm i, Mer is a dummy variable that captures the effect of discretionary accrual for firms that merged under duress 
and used stock as a means of settlement. It takes the value 1 if the involuntary consolidation was stock based. 
Otherwise, it takes zero. btrit*mer is the interaction between board turnover dummy variable and consolidation 
under duress involving stock for stock exchange. The outcome of this variable determines whether we would 
accept or reject our third hypothesis. btrit as a variable takes the value 1 if the involuntary merger resulted in a 
change of a CEO and otherwise, 0. szit is an explanatory variable that controls for market size measured by the 
stock market prices multiplied by the total number of shares divided by the total gross asset for the current year. 
roaeit is the performance control variable, which is defined as return on average equity. That is, profit after tax but 
before extra-ordinary items divided by shareholders’ fund. Evidence from Kothari et al (2005) has shown that firm 
with high roae will less likely involve in earnings management than firms that are at low profit margin. cfo is a 
control variable measuring the level of earnings management due to the level of cash flow from operating activities. 
It takes value 1 if the firm has negative cash flow from operations otherwise it takes 0. aqit controls for audit quality. 
The higher the quality of audit is less the likelihood that managers will engage in earnings management (Defond 
and Jiambalvo, 1991). Previous researches indicate that firms audited by the BIG 4 have more audit quality service 
than those not audited by the BIG 4. Hence, we assign 1 for those firms under our sample that are audited by the 
BIG 4. Otherwise, we assigned 0 for the firms. dbtit: This is the debt to book value ratio that controls for debt 
covenant. Firms with high debt ratio are likely to manage earnings upward to hide the reality from the creditor 
who may demand repayment (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Managing earnings upward will increase the book 
value thereby reducing the ratio. ostrit: This measures the influence of ownership structure on firm management. 
We measure this by the level of minority shareholders. The higher the level of minority shareholders is the higher 
the level of significant influence and the lower the level of controlling influence. How both concentrate can 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.7, 2016 
 
140 
influence the level of information to be disclosed. Hence, they both can influence firms’ earnings management 
behavior. The higher the level of institutional investors is the lower the likelihood of earnings management. This 
variable is expected to contain the level of earnings management. BDszit controls for firm characteristic defined in 
terms of board size. This variable will likely constrain discretionary accounting behavior of CEOs if the number 
of board members increases. pnedit: We feature this variable following Ramzi (2009). It controls for the presence 
of independent non-executive board members. Previous research from Ramzi (2009) shows that the variable limits 
the managers’ discretionary accounting behavior. Loss is a variable featured to capture the earnings management 
behavior of firm with negative roae. Firms with losses are more likely to engage in earnings management to cover 
the loss than those that have positive earnings. We assign 1 to firms with roae negative otherwise, they receive 0. 
έ is the estimation error. 
  
Real Activity Manipulation Model for Real Discretionary Cash Flow Detection   
Major model relating to real activity manipulation has been formulated by Dechow et al (1998). The model 
expresses in a regression the relationship between Cash Flow from Operation (CFO), sales and changes in sales. 
With the estimation coefficient determined, the normal CFO will be determined at firm level. The different 
between the actual CFO from balance sheet and the expected CFO is the discretionary CFO. The Discretionary 
CFO measures the level real activity manipulation. The model is stated thus: 
cfo=α0+α1+β1St+β2△St+έt                                                                                                                             (6) 
The variables except α0 are deflated by the lagged total asset variable at time t-1. S is the revenue or sales during 
the current year. △S is the marginal value of the current year’s sale and the previous year’s sales. cfo equals Cash 
flow from Operation at year t. That is, it measures the difference between the two consecutive sales at period t and 
t-1. From the above model 15, we estimate the level of discretionary cash flow from operation following 
acquisition by cash. We assume that when acquisition is by cash, real activity will be manipulated rather than 
accrual. Therefore, we specify our model thus: 
Dcfoit=α+β1itmercash+β2itbtrit*mercash+β3itivaqt+β4itSZit+β5itroaeit+β6itcfoit+β7itaqit+β8itdbtit+β9itostrit+β10itbdszit
+β11itpnedit+β12itLoss+έ                                                                           (7) 
Where Dcfo is the discretionary cash flow from operation deflated with lagged gross asset at year t-1. Other 
variables are as previously defined in equation 5. However, mercash equals mer-1 taking value 1 for acquisitions 
involving cash and otherwise zero. This shows we switched off firms whose method of acquisition is by stock 
exchange as our target is cashed-based acquisitions where manipulation of real activity can impact on real cash 




We start the discussion of the result of this paper by providing the univariate result relating to descriptive statistics 
and correlation matrix. Our main result discussion will be based on the multivariate analyses from where we would 
determine our postulated hypotheses.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
  Variables                  N          Minimum         
Maximum 
                 
Sum 
Mean         Std. 
Deviation 
Disc 24 .04 11.27 62.8 2.617 2.78039 
Cfo 24 .00 1.00 11.0 .4583 .50898 
Roae 24 2.07  27.51 303. 12.66 6.47069 
Sz 24 .00 2.40 11.1 .4630 .51806 
Source; Author Data used from BGL Database, CBN Database 
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Table 3;Descriptive Statistics Continues 
  Variables                  N          Minimum         
Maximum 
                 
Sum 
Mean         Std. 
Deviation 
Btr 24 .00 1.00 20.0 .8333 .38069 
Aq 24 .00 1.00 16.0 .6667 .48154 
Pned 24 .00 1.00 17.0 .7083 .46431 
Dbt 24 .01 17.27 85.3 3.556 4.76234 
Ostr 24 .00 7.39 46.9 1.954 2.20578 
Bdsz 24 2.00 16.00 206. 8.583 3.74069 
Mer 24 .00 1.00 17.0 .7083 .46431 
Loss 24 .00 1.00 12.0 .5000 .51075 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
24      
Source: Author; Data used from BGL Database, CBN Database 
DISC= Discretional Accrual Computed as the difference between total accrual from the balance and estimated 
normal accrual using Jones Model; MER=variable representing consolidation under duress and involving stock 
for stock exchange.  CFO= cash Flow from Operation; LOSS =loss; taking real value when the consolidating firm 
is making loss. BDSZ= board size; SZ=market capitalization measured as the ratio of total market value to book 
value. PNED; this is a variable representing the presence of non-executive direction. ROAE=a measure of 
performance-return on average equity. BDT=variable for debt covenant; OSTR= ownership structure. 
The maximum value of discretionary accrual by the merged firms is 11.27 while the minimum is .04. 
Compared to the mean value of 2.6177, we can infer that significant discretionary accounting occurred among the 
consolidating firms within the suspecting period. Although, we cannot judge the influence of board turnover on 
this high likelihood accrual manipulation, we can reasonably assume that the high level may be reversed by the 
‘big bath’ accounting behavior of incoming CEOs.  Our main analysis will centre on the multivariate result. 
Meanwhile, let us look at the correlation matrix below. 
Table 5: Pearson Correlation 
Var. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
 1 .50* .38 .48* -.4 -.2 .02 .44* .22 .25 .14 .45* 
Disc  .01 .06 .03 .08 .2 .91 .03 .28 .22 .49 .02 
  1 .36 .51* -.3 -.2 .03 .39 .07 .26 -.1 .58** 
Cfo   .08 .010 .21 .26 .85 .057 .72 .21 .49 .003 
   1 .56** .29 .17 .34 .004 .5* .31 .06 .43* 
 
Source: The Author; Pearson Correlation *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
Variables are as previously explained. Please, refer to table 1 above or variable definition for details. 
 
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Continues 
Var. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Roe    .01 .16 .40 .10 .98 .01 .12 .75 .03 
    1 -.1 -.3 .16 .45* .5** .5* -.1 .43* 
Sz     .80 .15 .43 .02 .01 .02 .63 .03 
     1 .39 .21 -.5* -.1 -.2 .5* .00 
Btr      .05 .34 .01 .80 .34 .02 1.0 
      1 .13 -.5** -.1 -.2 .13 -.17 
Aq       .54 .01 .48 .24 .54 .40 
       1 -.26 .07 -.3 .19 .09 
Pned        .21 .71 .19 .36 .67 
        1 .37 .22 -.1 .21 
Dbt         .07 .29 .53 .30 
         1 .4* -.3 .15 
Ostr          .04 .11 .46 
          1 -.3 .36 
Bdsz           .12 .08 
           1 -.27 
Mer            .19 
            1 
Loss             
Pearson Correlation 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10% 
Variables are as previously explained. Please, refer to table 1 above or variable definition for details. 
The above table gives us good insight into the relationship between discretionary accounting, consolidation under 
duress and contemporaneous board replacement. First, we can see from the result that when the board changes do 
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not interact with consolidation, managers do not seem to manage earnings to obtain stock-for–stock exchange. 
However, the second consolidation variable suggests that accrual manipulation follows consolidation. We found 
that board decrease limit CEOs earnings management behavior as the relationship is negative.  
Multivariate Results 
Involuntary Consolidation and Contemporaneous Board Turnover Analysis  
The result of this analysis is presented in table 4 below. We used 432 firm years in our analysis. Based on the 
multivariate result presented in table 4 below, we shall test the first and third hypotheses (H1) and (H3) we 
postulated respectively that ‘upward discretionary accounting does not occur when mergers and acquisitions 
are involuntary and are based on stock-for-stock exchange’, and ‘New CEOs that come along with mergers and 
acquisitions restructuring will not reverse the magnitude of earnings manipulation the outgoing CEOs 
perpetrated by managing earnings downward to blame the acquired outgoing managers for poor performance 
when acquisition is consummated under’ duress. We use the result of the following discretionary accrual multiple 
regression analysis in our tests. The key variables of interests are BTRit*mer, and mer. We shall accept or reject 
our hypotheses based on the direction of their coefficients. Negative vectors indicate that the variables limit and 
reverse discretionary accrual following consolidations under duress and/or board replacement. The main testing 
model is given thus: 
Discit=α+β1itmer+β2itbtrit*mer+β3itbtr+β4itszit+β5itroaeit+β6itcfoit+β7itaqit+β8itbdtit+β9itostrit+β9itbdszit+β10itpnedit++
β11itLoss+έ                                                                                               (8) 
Table 4: Involuntary Consolidation and Contemporaneous Board Turnover Multivariate Analysis  
Dependent Variable: Disc; Method of Analysis: Least Squares; Sample 24 banks 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors  & Covariance 
  Variable Coef.  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
mer 9.419530 1.924013 4.89577*** 0.0005 
Btr -3.582842 1.791381 -2.000045* 0.0708 
mer*btr -6.264591 2.373089 -2.63984** 0.0230 
Cfo 0.623594 1.235774 0.504618 0.6238 
roae -0.034396 0.113142 -0.304004 0.7668 
Sz 1.729491 1.144710 1.510855* 0.1090 
Aq 0.667913 1.034271 0.645781 0.5317 
pned -0.250931 0.895864 -0.280099 0.7846 
dbt -0.166053 0.137308 -1.209349 0.2519 
ostr 0.492793 0.387754 1.270890 0.2300 
*** Significant at 1%                                                                                                                                                        
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
 
Table 4: Involuntary Consolidation and Contemporaneous Board Turnover Multivariate Analysis 
Continues 
Dependent Variable: Disc; Method of Analysis: Least Squares; Sample 24 banks 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors  & Covariance 
 
bdsz -0.071628 0.205675 -0.348260 0.7342 
Loss 2.138272 1.531261 1.396413* 0.1001 
Α 1.362567 2.563080 0.531613 0.6056 
R-squared 0.818360     Mean dependent var 2.617713 
Adjusted R-squared 0.620207     S.D. dependent var 2.780390 
S.E. of regression 1.713481     Akaike info criterion 4.218105 
Sum squared resid 32.29617     Schwarz criterion 4.856218 
Log likelihood -37.61726     F-statistic 4.129944 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.045459     Prob(F-statistic) 0.012706 
Source: Author; Data used from CBN Statistical Bulletin, AfricanFinancial.com, BGL Database and Financial 
Statement of the sampled firms. Variables are as previously defined. Please refer to variable definition section. 
Before, we discuss the above result; we would like to examine the residual to ascertain the robustness of 
our multivariate result. We present the result in figure 1 below. 
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.7, 2016 
 
143 
Figure 1: Residual Test 
 
Source: Author 
The Jarque-Bera statistic indicates that the residual is normal and hence the outcome of the analysis will 
not lead to bias conclusion. The p-value (0.1386) is greater than 5% benchmark. Hence, we conclude that the 
residual is normally distributed. 
 
Discussion of Accrual Manipulation around Involuntary stock for stock Mergers and Acquisitions 
In table 4, we can see that the analysis shows that managers significantly manipulate accrual following mergers 
and acquisitions (coefficient=9.419530; p-value <1%). The variable that captures this effect is mer. The coefficient 
is positive and the positive sign points to the fact that managers are smoothening earnings with accrual to obtain 
share for share advantage. Based on this we reject our first hypothesis and conclude that significant earnings 
management occurs following involuntary acquisitions when the means of settlement involves stock for stock 
exchanges. This finding is consistent with the work of Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004) who found 
that, for instance in US, managers manipulate earnings to obtain share for share advantage. Our finding is however 
not consistent with findings of Heron and Lie (2002) and Purgaliya and Vijh (2009) who found that under good 
estimation model, there was no evidence of discretionary accounting following acquisitions for the purpose of 
benefiting from stock-for-stock exchange. We used strong estimation model. This can be seen from the high value 
of the R-Squared-0.82. Yet, we found that prior to consummating mergers, managers skewed earnings to favor a 
sect of investors. This favor relates to manipulating earnings to give the acquiring investors the chances of 
obtaining advantage of stock-for-stock exchange.  
 
Discussion on Discretionary Accrual, Involuntary Mergers and Acquisitions, and Contemporaneous Board 
Turnover 
In our third hypothesis (H3), we made an assumption that when CEOs manage earnings upward, change in board 
leadership as a result of consolidation restructuring can correct or reverse the anomaly by engaging in a ‘big bath’ 
accounting. Already, our previous alternative hypothesis that upward earnings management following mergers and 
acquisitions occurs has been accepted. From table 4, this level of earnings manipulated appears to be limited by 
income-decreasing incoming CEOs. The variable that indicates this behavior is BTR*MER. The interaction 
between board turnover and consolidation under duress negatively relates to discretionary accrual (β=-6.26). This 
is significant at 5%. When mergers and acquisitions are involuntary, but not interacting with board turnover the 
result is negative. However, the magnitude is low compared to when it interacts with involuntary consolidation. 
Comparing the two effects of mer and btr*mer, there is no complete reversal as the positive effect is greater than 
the negative effect. With this result, we reject our third null hypothesis (H3) that New CEOs that come along with 
mergers and acquisitions restructuring will not correct or reverse the magnitude of earnings manipulation the 
outgoing CEOs perpetrated by managing earnings downward to blame the acquired outgoing managers for poor 
performance when acquisition is consummated under duress. Therefore, we accept the alternative that when 
consolidation occurs with board leadership change, the likely accrual manipulated will be reversed by ‘big bath’ 
accounting new CEOs. Our result seems to suggest that where significant earnings management is observed 
following mergers and acquisitions, a change in some key officers could correct the abnormal earnings reported 

















Std. Dev.   1.184982
Skewness   0.852164
Kurtosis   4.016453
Jarque-Bera  3.937910
Probability  0.139603
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is because while CEOs are manipulating accrual upward by 9 point basis, the incoming CEOs are reversing the 
accrual at 6 point basis. The velocity of the accrual manipulation surpasses that of the correction by 3%. The 
reversal is statistically significant. However, since the relationship between the variable is not linear, the likelihood 
of the incoming CEOs totally offsetting the abnormal accrual exists in the long-run. The effectiveness of accrual 
correction due to restructuring that brings in a ‘big bath’ accounting players is more than the effectiveness of 
correcting the accrual by performance news as found by Pyung et al (2015) and Sloan (1996). Sloan (1996) for 
instance found that 40% of accrual is reversed due to counter performance news. However, when income-
decreasing non-routine CEOs take the leadership, in order to maximize their future compensation, they would 
reverse 67% of the managed accrual by their predecessors. However, this correction appears to be temporal as they 
would likely reload the accrual when the time is ripe for their promotion.  
In relation to other control variables, our study seems quite bizarre. First, we found that firms that are 
consolidating with negative cash flow do engage in incoming increasing accrual manipulations. Previous 
literatures report that when firms are at the border line of negative cash flow that they would likely engage in an 
upward discretionary accounting. Our study confirms this result as CFO has positive coefficient (β=0.62). 
However, the result is not statistically significant at 5% and 10% level. PNED and BDSZ, which represent the 
presence of non-executive directors and board size composition both constrain discretionary accounting, which is 
consistence with the extant literatures for instance (Ramzi 2009). Audit quality (aq) seems to be an unimportant 
constraint to accrual manipulation during involuntary acquisitions. Perhaps, under some pressure, the Big 4 
accounting firms relax their strictness. Only this could account for why the variable yielded positive result. Our 
result also shows that as the number of board members increases, the earnings management behavior of 
consolidating firms decreases consistent with extant literatures. Board characteristics constitute a good constraint 
to discretionary accounting. Several scholars believe that debt covenant leads to income increasing behavior of 
managers. However, our present result does not appear to agree with this view under the circumstances of 
involuntary acquisitions. High debt does not increase earnings management. Rather, we found that the variable 
reduces firms’ earnings management disposition under involuntary consolidation.  
 
Cash based Acquisition and contemporaneous Board Turnover: The Case Where Discretionary Cash Flow 
through Real Activity Manipulations Is Suspected. 
The previous researchers found that there is no real discretionary accounting following acquisition by cash. We 
postulated a hypothesis to test this assertion under involuntary acquisitions where real activity manipulations have 
occurred. There is strong anecdotal evidence that firms can engage in real activity manipulations when acquisitions 
involve outright cash payment. Therefore, the essence of this analysis is to examine the extent and direction of 
accrual manipulation when the acquisition is cash based and resulted in real activity manipulation. We use the 
Dechow et al (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) models to estimate the discretionary cash flow. We then regress 
the discretionary cash flow (DCFO) with board turnover and consolidation under duress to test the influence of 
the partitioning variables on the discretionary cash flow behavior of managers using the following model: 
Dcfoit=α+β1itivaqt+β2itSZit+β3itroaeit+β4itcfoit+β5itbtrit*mercash+β6itaqit+β7itdbtit+β8itostrit+β9itbdszit+β10itpnedit+β1
1itmercash+β12itLoss+έ                                                                          (9) 
We restate our second hypothesis (H2) that: When acquisitions are involuntary and cash based, significant upward 
discretionary accounting does not occur. The table 5 below provides us with the result of the analysis for the test. 
The main variables of interest are mercash and btr*mercash. Mercash is a variable that takes value 1 when 
acquisition is cash based. Otherwise 0, it will be switched off by assigning 0 to it. Hence, mercash equals the 
inverse of mer (mer-1).  However, we do not expect this relationship in terms of the effect on discretionary accrual. 
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Table 5: Multivariate Analysis of the Relationship between Discretionary Cash flow from Operation, Cash 
Based Acquisitions and Board turnover  
Variable                Coefficient          Std. Error            t-Statistic           Prob. 
 
Aq 0.687481 0.390223 1.761767 0.1529 
bdsz -0.090936 0.032573 -2.791787 0.0492 
btr*mercash -0.541727 0.522952 -1.035901 0.3588 
Loss 0.957669 0.559971 1.710212 0.1624 
mercash 0.997446 0.759273 1.313686 0.2592 
pned -0.231526 0.405280 -0.571275 0.5984 
Roae -0.030196 0.046480 -0.649652 0.5513 
Ostr 0.040139 0.094493 0.424781 0.6928 
Cfo 0.295648 0.320404 0.922736 0.4084 
Sz 0.024248 0.024621 0.984857 0.3805 
Α 0.090830 0.464909 0.195372 0.8546 
R-squared 0.835238     Mean dependent var 0.386000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.423335     S.D. dependent var 0.440500 
Source: Author Using E-view; Data used as outlined in table 3 and sample selection section. DCFO 
=discretionary cash flow from operation measuring real activity manipulation during acquisition involving 
cash payment.  
The above table 5 shows that when acquisitions involve cash, firms manipulate real activity to impact 
on cash flow. Having switched of acquisition involving stock exchange, we found that firms consolidating under 
duress manipulated discretionary cash flow to leverage capital or to obtain benefit of lower real cash out flow 
during acquisitions. The coefficient of Mercash, which captures this behavior, is positive (β=0.99). However, the 
manipulation is not statistically significant (p-value > 5%). We, therefore, accept the null hypothesis (H2) that 
when acquisitions are involuntary and cash based, significant upward discretionary accounting does not occur 
despite real activity being manipulated. With board leadership change, the incoming CEOs reduce this reality but 
at a rate not above 55%. However, in comparison with the acquisition involving stock-for–stock exchange, the 
reversal is well over 66% and statistically significant at 5%. This suggests that the bulk of discretionary accounting 
reversal or correction will stem from acquisition involving stock swaps. Our present result is, however, inconsistent 
with Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004), who believe that when acquisition involves cash, that managers 
do not engage in an upward income manipulation at all.         
 
Summary and Conclusion              
We have, through this study, provided empirical evidence that under involuntary consolidation, firms engage in 
upward earnings management to obtain share for share exchange benefit on one hand and on the other hand to 
escape liquidation option. Likewise, when the cost of acquisition involves cash payment, firms contrary to previous 
findings do engage in upward earnings management through real activity manipulation. Although we found an 
upward discretionary accounting behavior of consolidating firms, where the activity involves change of board 
leaders, the incoming CEOs engage in ‘big bath’ accounting that has the potency to reverse the manipulated 
earnings. However, this reversal is substantial when the method of consummation is stock for stock exchange 
rather than cash based. We can infer that where discretionary accounting is suspected around mergers and 
acquisitions particularly the case of bank mergers and acquisitions involving stock for stock exchange, corporate 
restructuring that ushers in new board leaders could be healthy in deleting spurious accrual.  
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